مشخصات مقاله:
عنوان فارسی مقاله:
رویکرد رقابت مالیاتی برای وضع مالیات منابع در کشورهای در حال توسعه
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
A tax competition approach to resource taxation in developing countries
کلمات کلیدی مقاله:
کشورهای منبع، مالیات اجاره، مزایا و امتیازها، گزارش نادرست هزینه
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی:
Resource countries – Rent taxes – Royalties – Cost misreporting
مناسب برای رشته های دانشگاهی زیر:
حسابداری
مناسب برای گرایش های دانشگاهی زیر:
حسابداری مالیاتی
وضعیت مقاله انگلیسی و ترجمه:
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فهرست مطالب:
Abstract
Keywords
JEL classification
1. Introduction
2. The model
3. Optimal tax design under constant overstatement
3.1. Absence of tax competition
3.2. Tax competition
4. Optimal tax design in the absence of overstatement
5. Conclusion
Appendix C. Supplementary data
Appendix A. Derivation of threshold
Appendix B. Optimal tax design under variable overstatement
Absence of tax competition
Tax competition
Comparison
Research Data
References
قسمتی از مقاله انگلیسی:
1. Introduction
The strong dependence of some developing countries on extractive resources is a well-known source of vulnerability. Most of these countries have low tax rates and often proceed by trial and error in using various instruments to tax the rent on non-renewal resources. Previous research suggests the use of both royalties and profit taxes (corporate income tax, for example) among a range of other tax categories for extracting resources (IMF, 2012). While it is usually easy to show the distortive character of an ad-valorem tax levied directly on the extraction of the resource (the royalty), the analysis becomes more interesting when considering the possibility for mining companies to reduce their taxable income by cost manipulation. Boadway and Keen (2010, 2015) justify the use of profit taxes and royalties in presence of asymmetries of information. This aspect is particularly relevant for low-income countries where governments have a severe informational disadvantage vis-a-vis � resource extraction companies (Collier, 2010). Among the open questions, an important one concerns the pressures from international tax competition for attracting mining companies on resource tax policy. In this paper, we aim to give some insight into this issue. More specifically, we contribute to the research on tax design for extractive resources in low-income countries under international tax competition. We build a partial equilibrium model of two countries where the government sets royalties and profit taxes to attract a foreign extractive firm.