مشخصات مقاله:
عنوان فارسی مقاله:
حاکمیت شرکتی و مدیریت درآمد در بازارهای متمرکز
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
Corporate governance and earnings management in concentrated markets
کلمات کلیدی مقاله:
حاکمیت شرکتی، هيئت مدیره، مدیریت درآمد تعهدی، مدیریت درآمد واقعی، غلظت بازار
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی:
Corporate governance – Board of directors – Accrual earnings management – Real earnings management – Market concentration
مناسب برای رشته های دانشگاهی زیر:
حسابداری
مناسب برای گرایش های دانشگاهی زیر:
حسابداری مالی
وضعیت مقاله انگلیسی و ترجمه:
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فهرست مطالب:
Abstract
Keywords
1. Introduction
2. Literature and hypotheses development
2.1. Market concentration and earnings management
2.2. Corporate governance and earnings management
2.3. The impact of corporate governance on earnings management in concentrated markets
3. Data, variable definitions, and descriptive statistics
3.1. Data
3.2. Earnings management measures
3.3. Market concentration measures
3.4. Corporate governance index
3.5. Control variables
3.6. Descriptive statistics
4. Methodology
5. Results
5.1. Market concentration and earnings management
5.2. The impact of corporate governance on earnings management in concentrated markets.
6. Additional analysis
7. Conclusion
Acknowledgement
Declaration of Competing Interest
Appendix A. Measurement of earnings management
References
قسمتی از مقاله انگلیسی:
1. Introduction
Although corporate governance plays an important role in ensuring the presence of control mechanisms in the absence of competition (Campbell, Hollingsworth, & Lindberg, 1991), it sometimes failed to prevent financial malpractices in concentrated markets. Some examples are evidenced in the search engines and soda production markets that represent ones of the most concentrated industries in the United States who significantly implement standards and policies to govern their operations (IBIS World, 2012). In the search engines market, Microsoft was involved in ‘cookie jar’ accounting practices that attempted to smooth earnings through financial reserves in order to make profits more stable over time (The New York Times, 1999). In the same sector, Google manipulated its accounting records to avoid high tax payments by moving its earnings to low tax jurisdictions around the world (The Telegraph, 2012). In the soda production sector, Coca Cola overstated its assets with an amount of $9 million (CNN, 2003), and the financial controller of Pepsi Co. created fictitious vendor accounts of $8.7 million between 1998 and 2009 (Accounting Today, 2016). The previous examples raise doubts about the effectiveness of governance mechanisms in preventing accounting manipulation in concentrated industries. The level of industry competition, as measured by market concentration, can increase the propensity of firms to engage in earnings management. This can be attributed to three main reasons. First, the lower competition between firms in such markets decreases the probability that at least one of the firms will be willing to provide investors with accurate information, and thus makes it less likely for other companies that manipulate their accounts to be detected (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2008). Second, the lower degree of competition for sources of finance in concentrated markets lessens companies’ need to provide more information in order to reduce their cost of capital (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Hoberg & Phillips, 2010). Third, the absence of the disciplinary power of competition demotivates managers from making efforts due to the lower chances of being compared to others (Hart, 1983; Nalebuff & Stiglitz, 1983).