مشخصات مقاله:
عنوان فارسی مقاله:
حاکمیت شرکتی و چرخه زندگی در بازارهای نوظهور
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
Corporate governance and life cycles in emerging markets
کلمات کلیدی مقاله:
نظریه آژانس – Bovespa ،حاکمیت شرکتی، چرخه زندگی شرکت ها، بازارهای نوظهور، نوو مرکادو
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی:
Agency theory – Bovespa – Corporate governance – Corporate life cycle – Emerging markets – Novo mercado
مناسب برای رشته های دانشگاهی زیر:
مدیریت
مناسب برای گرایش های دانشگاهی زیر:
مدیریت کسب و کار، بازاریابی
وضعیت مقاله انگلیسی و ترجمه:
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فهرست مطالب:
Abstract
Graphical abstract
JEL classification
Keywords
1. Introduction
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
3. Variable and sample descriptions
4. Regression analysis and results
5. Robustness tests
6. Concluding remarks
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
References
قسمتی از مقاله انگلیسی:
1. Introduction
Principal-agent theory portrays a narrow, static, corporate governance function, ignoring the resource and strategic roles for corporate governance espoused by Filatotchev et al. (2006): corporate governance exists solely to perform a monitoring role whereby shareholders (principles) appoint a board of directors (agents) to monitoring the behavior of self-serving managers. However, there is a gap in the literature as, contrary to the commonly prescribed universal/static approach, firms may maximize shareholders wealth by emphasising different corporate governance functions according to their needs at each stage of their life cycle. This life cycle view of corporate governance posits that the role of corporate governance serves different purposes along the life cycle suggesting the existence of an optimal level of corporate governance at each life cycle stage. Specifically, after firm inception, various subsequent corporate life-cycles have been commonly identified and the need for governance to provide agency, resource, and strategic functions varies at each life cycle stage (see, for example, Filatotchev et al., 2006; and Wright et al., 2013).1 There is also an alternative view of how firms adopt changes in corporate governance, the bonding view, which states that firms self-select into stricter regulation independently of the life cycle predictions by adopting a stock exchange listing level, either domestically (e.g., Bovespa listing levels in Brazil) or abroad (e.g., non-U.S. firms bond to NYSE listing standards), that fits the governance needs of the organization, consistent with the conjectures of Phelps et al. (2007). 2 The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether firms have a predetermined corporate governance according to the life cycle stage or whether managers are able to adopt the optimum corporate governance according to their needs (i.e. financing, monitoring, and strategy requirements) at any point during their corporate life cycle.