مشخصات مقاله:
عنوان فارسی مقاله:
مداخله FRC (شورای گزارشگری مالی)، کیفیت گزارشگری مالی و ارزیابی صلاحیت
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
FRC intervention, financial reporting quality and due diligence
کلمات کلیدی مقاله:
مداخله FRC، کیفیت گزارشگری مالی، تأخیر گزارش حسابرس
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی:
FRC intervention – Financial reporting quality – Auditor report lag
مناسب برای رشته های دانشگاهی زیر:
حسابداری
مناسب برای گرایش های دانشگاهی زیر:
حسابداری مالی
وضعیت مقاله انگلیسی و ترجمه:
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فهرست مطالب:
Abstract
Graphical abstract
JEL classification
Keywords
1. Introduction
2. Background
3. Theory and related literature
3.1. Auditors’ opinion
3.2. Audit report lag
4. Research design and data
4.1. Auditor opinion analysis
4.2. Audit report lag
4.3. Sample selection
5. Empirical findings
5.1. FRC disclosure and audit opinion
5.2. Heterogeneity tests
5.3. FRC disclosure and audit efficiency
6. Conclusion
Funding
Declarations of interest
Acknowledgements
Appendix A
References
قسمتی از مقاله انگلیسی:
1. Introduction
Corporate governance is crucial to firm success, and annual audits are a cornerstone of corporate governance (Cadbury, 1992). Following several accounting scandals in the early 21 st century (e.g. Enron and WorldCom), the literature has increasingly focused on public oversight of the audit profession (e.g. Carcello et al., 2011; DeFond and Lennox, 2017). In the UK, exercising this oversight is a central role of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). In 2008, the FRC began to publish inspection reports for major audit firms with UK clients (FRC, 2016).1 These reports provide inspection results for individual audit firms, enabling clients to distinguish between high- and low-quality firms. This study extends previous research by examining the impact of the FRC’s disclosure of individual inspection reports on financial reporting quality and due diligence, including the likelihood of clients receiving qualified audit opinions, and the time taken for clients to receive signed off auditors’ reports. In order to protect their reputation, audit firms may be “tough or conservative’’ on important reporting issues and devote additional inputs into audits. Intuitively, the greater the expertise brought to reporting decisions, the more likely that misstatements will be detected. However, “gaming” behaviour by audit firms (e.g. “meet or beat”) may reduce the quality of the reports’ content (Christensen et al., 2016). With regard to the time taken to produce audit reports and to reduce reputational damage, on the one hand, auditors may spend more time than they used to, and on the other hand, this additional input into the auditing process may also improve auditing efficiency, thereby reducing the time and work involved in the audit engagement. Overall, the consequences of FRC disclosure are thus open to question.